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GLOBAL GAMES AND  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION' 
BY HANS  CARLSSON AND ERIC  VAN DAMME 
A global game is an incomplete  information game where the actual payoff structure is 
determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a 
noisy observation of the selected  game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise 
vanishes,  iterated  elimination  of  dominated  strategies  in  the  global  game  forces  the 
players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion. 
KEYwORDS:  Global  games, equilibrium selection,  risk dominance,  payoff uncertainty, 
incomplete  information, common knowledge, iterated dominance. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
ANY  MODEL,  BY  ITS  NATURE,  is  based  on  assumptions  that  schematize  and 
simplify the  phenomena  under investigation. The  basic assumption underlying 
main-stream game-theoretic  models  is that the rules of the game, including its 
payoff  structure  and  the  rationality of  the  players,  are  common  knowledge. 
There  seems  to  be  almost  general  agreement  that  game  theory's  agents  are 
excessively rational and well-informed  in comparison with their real-life coun- 
terparts. One way of assessing the role of this kind of assumption is to compare 
the model with perturbed variants that are based on slightly modified assump- 
tions. In this manner, Harsanyi's (1973) games with randomly disturbed payoffs 
and  Selten's  (1975)  concept  of  trembling-hand perfection  perturb certain  as- 
pects of game theory's information and rationality assumptions. Analyzing such 
richer models may yield considerable benefits: Harsanyi's approach produces a 
plausible  justification  and  interpretation  of  mixed  strategy  equilibria  while 
Selten's  approach  frequently  leads  to  a  drastic  reduction  in  the  number  of 
possible solutions. 
The  present paper pursues this line of research by analyzing an incomplete 
information model-to  be called a global game-which  is based on a perturba- 
tion of the players' payoff information in 2 x 2 games. The game to be played is 
determined  by a  random draw from  some  subclass of  all  2 x 2  games.  Each 
player observes the selected  game with some noise and then chooses one of his 
two  available  actions.  If  the  initial  subclass  of  games  is  large  enough  and 
contains  games  with  different  equilibrium  structures,  iterated  elimination  of 
dominated  strategies  in  the  incomplete  information  game  yields  a  surprising 
result: When the 2 x 2 game actually selected  by Nature is one with two strict 
Nash  equilibria,  iterated  dominance  forces  the  players to  coordinate  on  the 
equilibrium which is risk-dominant in the sense  of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), 
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provided  that  the  amount  of  noise  in  the  players' observations  is  sufficiently 
small. 
The  result is surprising because  strict equilibria have proved to be  immune 
against  most  perturbations  and  refinement  criteria;  for  instance,  any  strict 
equilibrium survives strategic stability a la Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). More 
specifically, our  result  goes  against Harsanyi's (1973)  conclusion  that,  generi- 
cally, any Nash  equilibrium in  a normal form game  can be  approximated by 
equilibria of  games  with  randomly disturbed payoffs. The  explanation  of  this 
apparent contradiction is that we use  a quite different payoff perturbation: In 
Harsanyi's set-up the payoff matrices of different players are independent  and 
each  player only  learns  his  own matrix. Hence,  the  players' observations  are 
uncorrelated  so  a  player's beliefs  do  not  depend  on  his  information but  are 
common knowledge. By contrast, in our model, both players make noisy obser- 
vations  of  the  entire  game.  As  a  result,  different  players'  observations  are 
correlated and a player's (first and higher order) beliefs depend on his observa- 
tion.  For  a more  extensive  comparison between  the  two  models,  we  refer to 
Section  7.2,  where  we  also  briefly raise  the  question  regarding their  relative 
appropriateness,  and to Appendix  B where  we  construct a hybrid model  that 
contains our model and Harsanyi's as special cases. 
Our result is driven by the fact that, in a global game, the uncertainty forces 
the players to take account of the entire class of a priori possible games which 
may be  large  even  if  the  amount  of  noise  is  small. When  the  class  contains 
games with  different equilibrium structures, players have to  switch actions  at 
some  points  in  their observation  spaces.  Equilibrium selection  in  accordance 
with risk dominance results from the conditions which optimally chosen switch- 
ing points must satisfy in the limit, as noise vanishes. Hence,  there is a certain 
parallel between  our approach and the  axiomatic models  which, starting with 
Nash's (1950, 1953) bargaining analyses, derive determinate solutions to individ- 
ual  games  by  imposing  consistency  requirements  on  classes  of  games.  An 
important  difference,  though,  is  that  in  the  present  model  the  consistency 
conditions-instead  of  simply being  postulated-are  derived from more basic 
assumptions  about  the  players'  information  in  a  full-fledged  noncooperative 
game.  This  feature  also  distinguishes  our  approach from existing equilibrium 
selection  theories-such  as  Harsanyi  and  Selten's  (1988)  tracing  pro- 
cedure-where  the solution to a game typically results from the application of 
some  more  or  less  ad  hoc  scheme  of  expectation  formation.  Hence  our  ap- 
proach  can  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  extend  Nash's  (1951)  program  of 
providing noncooperative  foundations for axiomatic solution concepts. 
The various links between  this paper and the above cited works will be given 
a more  extensive  discussion  later. At  present  we will study a simple  example 
which catches the basic intuition for our result. This will be  a suitable context 
for providing an explicit  definition  of  the  notion  of  risk dominance  for  2 x 2 
games. 
Let  g(x)  be  the  2 x 2  game  shown  in  Figure  1, and  consider  the  class  of 
games {g(x)}x E R. Note  that g(x)  has strict dominance solution  a = (a 1, a2)  for GLOBAL  GAMES  991 
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FIGURE 1.-Game  g(x). 
x > 4  and  13 -  (/31,/32)  for  x <  0.  If  x e (0, 4),  both  a  and  /8 are  strict Nash 
equilibria. Then, according to Harsanyi and Selten (1988), a  risk-dominates 13  if 
a  is associated with the largest product of deviation losses and vice versa. These 
products are given by x2 for a  and (4 -  x)2 for 13,  so a  is risk-dominant in g(x) 
if  x E (2,4)  while 13  is risk-dominant for x E (0, 2). To see  the intuition for the 
risk dominance criterion, note that each player will choose  a  or 18  according as 
he believes  that the probability of the opponent  playing 1 is smaller or larger 
than  x/4.  Hence,  if  x < 2, playing 1 is less risky than playing a  in the sense 
that,  for  each  player,  13  is  justified  by  a  larger  range  of  beliefs  about  the 
opponent's  action. 
For  g(x)  with  x E (2,4),  playing  a  can  be  motivated  by  an  analogous 
argument. In these games, however, there is a conflict between  risk dominance 
and  payoff dominance:  Although  a  is  risk-dominant both  players prefer  the 
outcome  (4,4)  associated with 1. Many people  feel  it is obvious that 13  should 
be  selected  in this case.  Harsanyi and Selten,  too,  consider that payoff domi- 
nance should be given precedence  over risk dominance. We will now show how, 
in our approach, rational players are forced  to pick the risk-dominant equilib- 
rium even when the other equilibrium is Pareto-preferred. 
Consider the  incomplete  information game where  x  is the  realization  of  a 
random variable X  which is uniform on some interval [x, x] such that x < 0 and 
x >  4; given x,  each player i  makes an observation corresponding to a random 
variable Xi  which is uniform on [x -  E, x + E]  for some  E > 0, the two players' 
observation errors  Xl  -  x  and  X2 -  x  being  independent;  having made  their 
observations, the players choose  actions simultaneously and get payoffs corre- 
sponding to  g(x).  It is understood that the structure of the class of games and 
the joint distribution of  X,  X1 and X2 are common knowledge. 
It is easily seen that player i's posterior of X will be uniform on [xi -  E,  xi + E] 
if  he  observes  xi e [x + E, T  -  E], so  his  conditionally  expected  payoff  from 
choosing  ai  will simply be  xi. Moreover, for xi E [x + r, x -  E], the conditional 
distribution of the opponent's observation Xj  will be symmetric around xi  and 
have  support  [xi -  2?,  xi +  2?].  Hence,  Prob{Xj <xixi}  =  Prob{Xj >xiJx}  = 
1/2. 
Now assume E <  -x/2  and suppose i observes xi < 0. Then his conditionally 
expected  payoff from choosing  ai  is certainly negative and, thus, smaller than 
the payoff associated with 13i. Hence  /3i  is conditionally (strictly) dominant for i 
when he observes  xi < 0. It should be clear that iterated dominance arguments 
allow us to get further. For instance, if player 2 is restricted to playing  132  for 
observations  x2 <  0,  then  player  1,  observing  xl = 0,  must  assign  at  least 992  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
probability  1/2  to  f32. Consequently,  l's  conditionally  expected  payoff from 
playing 81 will be at least 2, so  a,  (which yields 0) can be excluded by iterated 
dominance for xl  = 0. Let  x*  be the smallest observation for which  8i  cannot 
be  established  by iterated  dominance.  By symmetry, obviously,  x  =x24= x 
Iterated dominance requires player i to play pi for any xi <x*,  so if j observes 
x*  he  will  assign  at  least  probability  1/2  to  i's  choosing  Pi  and,  thus,  j's 
expected  payoff from choosing  8j  will be  at least  2. Since j's  expected  payoff 
from  choosing  aj  equals  x*,  we  must  have  x* > 2,  for  otherwise  iterated 
dominance would require j  to play 8j when he observes  x*. 
Proceeding in the same way for large values of the observations, we see that, 
for E < (x -  4)/2,  ai  is dominant for each player if  xi > 4. Letting  x**  denote 
the  lower bound  on  the  iterated  dominance  region  for  a,  we  find that,  if  j 
observes x**,  his expected payoff from choosing  83j  will be at most 2 given that 
i  conforms to  iterated  dominance.  Since  x**  equals  j's  expected  payoff from 
choosing  aj, we conclude that  x** < 2. Combining this with the above and the 
obvious fact that x* Ax**,  we get 
x* =x** = 2. 
In words, iterated dominance in the global game forces equilibrium selection in 
accordance with risk dominance in the sense that each player i should play the 
risk-dominant equilibrium of g(xi)  for any xi E (0, 2) U (2,4). As the reader may 
have noticed,  this does  not  imply that  players always coordinate  on  the  risk- 
dominant equilibrium of the actual game g(x).  However, such coordination will 
be ensured if, for given x, one requires E to be small enough (pick E <  Ix -  21). 
The  main purpose of  the  paper is to  show that the  above result holds in a 
fairly general way for 2 x 2 games. In particular the result will be shown not to 
depend on the symmetries exploited in the example nor on the exact shapes of 
the  probability distributions nor on  the  underlying class of  games being  one- 
dimensional. On the other hand, from the previous argument it is clear that we 
do need some assumption on the class of games. The result depends critically on 
the  existence-within  this  class-of  a  subclass of  dominance  solvable  games 
that serve as take-offs for the  iterated dominance argument, and, thus, exert a 
kind of remote influence on the games with multiple equilibria. 
To illustrate the last point and to get a more detailed intuition for our result, 
let us assume that  x = 3 so that Nature has selected  the game g(3) where /8 is 
Pareto-dominant but a  is risk-dominant. Assuming that E is small, say 8  <  1/4, 
both  players  will  know  these  fact5  about  a  and  /3  from  their  observations 
x1, x2 E [3 -  , 3 + 8].  Each player will even know that his opponent  knows that 
,/  is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium (observing xi,  i  knows that the conditional 
support  of  X  given  xi  belongs  to  [xi -  3E, xi + 38]).  Why, then,  cannot  the 
players coordinate on  ,3? The reason is that their choices at xl  and x2 have to 
be  part of  a consistent  plan for  all possible  observations.  By the  strict domi- 
nance of  ai  for xi > 4, each player would have to switch from ai  to  8i at some 
observation  x* E [3,4].  However,  given any switching point  XJ  for the  oppo- GLOBAL  GAMES  993 
nent,  each  player would  like  to  switch  slightly below  x7  as  long  as  xe  > 2. 
Hence  the result. 
The  key to understanding the phenomenon  is the realization that there is a 
sharp separation between  knowledge and common knowledge in a global game. 
Even though, when their observations are close to 3, the players know that ,B is 
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and even though, for small E, each knows that 
the other knows this, this information is not common knowledge for any positive 
E. As  a matter of fact, the only information that is common knowledge is that 
some  game  g(x)  with  xe  [x,5]  has  to  be  played.  This  lack  of  common 
knowledge  enables  remote  areas (viz. those  where  a  or  :  is  the  dominance 
solution)  to  influence  the behavior when  the  observations are close  to 3. This 
phenomenon  also supplies a deeper motivation for using the term global games: 
When determining rational behavior it is not enough to look at the equilibrium 
structure that is known to prevail; it must also be ensured that the chosen action 
is part of a consistent plan for all situations that could have occurred within the 
underlying class of games. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
notation that will be used for 2 x 2 games and provides a convenient alternative 
characterization of the risk dominance relation for such games. In Section 3 we 
formally define  global  games  and  state  our  main  result,  which  is  proved  in 
Section  4.  Section  5  discusses  the  role  of  our  assumptions,  while  Section  6 
discusses  the  result,  in  particular  its  relationship  to  Harsanyi  and  Selten's 
justification of risk dominance and to Nash's works. Section 7 deals with related 
literature on games with payoff uncertainty and Section 8 concludes. 
2.  2 x  2 GAMES  AND  RISK  DOMINANCE 
This section introduces notation and definitions to be used in the subsequent 
analysis. A  2 x 2 game is a two-person normal form game where  each  player 
i E  {1, 2} can choose between two pure actions ai  and 8i3. Let G be the set of all 
2 x 2 games.  Clearly, since  such  a game  is fully described by its  eight  payoff 
entries, G can be identified with R8. For g E G, a mixed action for player i is a 
probability distribution si on {ai, f3i}. We identify si with the probability which 
si assigns to  ai.  If  s =  (Sl,  S2)  is  an action  pair, we  write  gi(s)  for player  i's 
expected payoff when s is played in g. Moreover, we write gfa (resp. go) for the 
loss  that  i  incurs by  deviating  unilaterally from  the  action  pair  a=  (a1,  a2) 
(resp. /3 -  (31,32)).  Hence  for i, j E {1, 2}, i = j, 
ga  =gi  (a)  -gi  (8i,  aj), 
91 = gi  ( 13) -  gi (ai  1j) , 
For y E {a, ,3},  Gy is the set of games where  y  is a strict Nash equilibrium: 
G=  {ge  G: g7 >0  for i=  1,2= 994  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
D7  denotes the subset of  GP where yi is a strictly dominant action for player i: 
D a=  {geGa:gg3<O}, 
Di=  (gE  G  :ga  <0), 
and  Dy  denotes  the  set  of  games  for  which  y  is  the  iterated  dominance 
solution: 
D7  =D'1  UD2. 
Generically, games in G have one or three equilibria. In the latter case, there 
is one (weak) equilibrium in mixed strategies as well as two (strict) pure strategy 
equilibria. We may, without loss of generality, focus on the case where both  a 
and ,B are strict equilibria. For g E Ga  n GI,  a  is said to risk-dominate ,3 if the 
product of deviation losses is larger at a  than at ,B, i.e. if 
(2.1)  gaga>  gJg, 
while ,B risk-dominates a  if the reverse inequality holds. 
The  basic  intuition  behind  risk dominance  stands  out  more  clearly in  the 
following alternative characterization, which we will use in the sequel. Let Vi(s1) 
denote  player i's net gain from playing ai  rather than /3i  when j  plays aj  with 
probability sj: 
VJ(s1)  =  S1gi  -(1-s1)gi. 
For  g E Ga  n G,  let  s  denote  the  unique  solution  to  Vi(s)  =  0,  i.e.  the 
probability which j  should attach to  a1 to make i  indifferent between  his two 
actions: 
g, 
(2.2)  SJ  1I  P  (.)  Si 
= 
ga  +  gp~ 
(Note  that  (S,  S2)  is  the  mixed  strategy equilibrium of  g.)  Clearly, i  should 
choose  a.  or /3i  according as he considers the actual  sj  to be larger or smaller 
than  3-j. Hence  a small  sj  implies a large range of beliefs which justify choosing 
ai.  This  provides  a  rationale  for  using  risk  dominance  as  an  equilibrium 
selection  criterion, for (2.1) is equivalent to 
(2.3)  S  +s2  <1. 
We write Ra (resp. R)  for the set of games where  a  (resp. /)  either is the 
unique strict equilibrium or risk-dominates /3  (resp. a): 
Ra = {g E Ga: if g3, g  > 0,  then S + S2<1}, 
R=  {g  E G:  if ga,  ga>  0, then  S-+S2>  1}. 
It is convenient to introduce the notation  Gi+ for the set of games for which 
the  denominator  in  (2.2)  is  positive  and  to  extend  the  definition  of 
- 
from 
n  n G3  to G+.  Note that D7 cRy  and that the sets D7, Ry, and G+  are open GLOBAL  GAMES  995 
in R8  (i  E {1, 2}, yE  {a,  f})  and that 
(2.4)  RanG  nG2+=(gEGanG  nG  :  s 
3.  GLOBAL  GAMES  AND  ITERATED  DOMINANCE 
We now picture the players in a situation where it is common knowledge that 
some game in G will be played but the players do not know which one. Initially, 
they have common prior beliefs  represented  by a probability distribution with 
support  on  some  subclass  of  G.  However,  before  choosing  his  action,  each 
player gets additional (private) information in the form of a fuzzy observation of 
the  actual game to be played. The resulting incomplete  information game-to 
be called a global game-may  thus be described by the following steps: 
1. Nature selects  a game from G. 
2. Each player observes  g  with some noise. 
3. Players choose  actions simultaneously. 
4. Payoffs are determined by g  and the players' choices. 
Since  G  may be  identified  with  R  8,  a  simple  way  of  modeling  the  above 
situation  would  be  to  let  the  players make  observations  directly in  R  8;  each 
player would then observe the payoffs of the actual game plus some error terms. 
Here, however, we will use an alternative formulation where the selected  game 
is observed  indirectly through some  parameter space which is mapped  on  G. 
Therefore,  let  & be a parameter space such that to any x  in & corresponds a 
game g(x)  in G. We assume: 
(Al)  &  is  an  open  subset  of  RAm for  some  m, g:  & -*  G  is  continuously 
differentiable  and the partial derivatives dgk/dxl  (k = 1, ...  , 8; 1 = 1, ...  , m)  are 
bounded on 0. 
The  advantage  with  this  parametric  formulation  is  that  it  allows  a  more 
flexible modeling of various classes of games. For instance, it makes it possible 
to represent the class of games corresponding to Figure 1 as a one-dimensional 
space.  The  case  where  players  observe  payoffs  directly may be  modeled  by 
letting  & c  1R8 and g(x)  = x  for all x E 0. 
We  let  the  players' prior be  described by a random variable  X  that takes 
values in &. Moreover, Player i's observation is described by a random variable 
Xi- which is defined by 
Xi'=X+e  Ei,  i=  l,2, 
where  Ei  is  a  random variable that  takes values  in  Rm  and  ? > 0  is  a  scale 
parameter. In what follows, 0,  g,  X,  E1, and E2 will remain fixed and we write 
F6 for the global game parameterized by E. We are particularly interested in the 
case where  the observations are almost correct so we will focus on  F6  with  e 996  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
close to zero. We make the following  assumptions: 
(A2)  X admits a density h which is strictly  positive, continuously differentiable, 
and bounded on  6. 
(A3)  The vector (E1, E2)  is independent of X  and admits a  continuous den- 
sity q'. 
(A4) The support of each Ei is contained in a ball with radius 1 around 0 in  lm. 
A strategy  for i is a measurable  function si that assigns  a probability  mixture 
on {ai, 13i}  to each observation  xi of player i in F-. We let 0?T  be the set of all 
possible observations  for i, Sff denotes the set of strategies  for i, and we write 
si(xi) for the probability  which si assigns  to the action ai at xi. 
Let VJ'(sjIxj) denote the expected net gain for player i from playing ai  rather 
than j8i  when he observes  xi and player  j uses strategy  sj in F6. If ViJ(sjlxi)  > 0 
(resp. Vi/(s,Ixi)  < 0) for all sj E Sj, then ai (resp. /3i)  is (conditionally) dominant 
at xi. Hence, we may define the following process of iterated elimination  of 
strategies  which prescribe  dominated  actions  for some observations: 
S  =Si=,  A  ?'0=+,  Bf'0=4, 
SE,n  -=  {S  E  SE:  Si(Xi) 
1  if  xE1  A'n  and  s O(xi)  0 if  xE  B  i-  i  i  SiXJ  i  i  a  ix-  xi  i1 
AEn  =l{xi  E= E:  ViJ(sjlxi)  > 0  for all  SESjEjn}, 
BT'i~1  Xl{ 
Ixi  E  OE:  VJE(sjhxi)  < 0  for all s1ESf'}. 
The following  properties,  which hold for all i and n, are immediate  from the 
definitions: 
AE,  nBEln  -n,  XAi  n B E  n=?  S  pn+? 
A  i,+  D>A E,  n  Bi ',+  D)B E,  n  Si  C,+  SiE 
Let us define 
00  00 
A--= U A'  i,  BT= U B  E, 
n=O  n=O 
We say that a (resp. ,B)  is iteratively  dominant at x in  FE  if x eAl  n A'  (resp. 
x E B1 n B2). The main result of the paper is the following  theorem. 
THEOREM: Let  y E {a, ,3}. If x  lies on  a  continuous curve C such that C c 
6, g(C)  c R'Y,  and g(C)  n Dy  , then y is iteratively  dominant at x in Fr  if E is 
sufficiently  small. 
For the nontrivial  case where g(x) has two strict  equilibria,  the Theorem  says 
that iterated dominance in the global game forces each player to select the 
risk-dominant  equilibrium  of the game corresponding  to his observation  pro- 
vided that E is sufficiently  small.  The next section provides  the essential  steps of GLOBAL  GAMES  997 
the  proof of  the  Theorem,  but some  technical  details will be  deferred  to  the 
Appendix.  The  role  of  the  assumptions  underlying the  Theorem  will  be  dis- 
cussed in Section 5. 
4.  PROOF  OF THE  THEOREM 
The Theorem consists of two completely symmetric statements according as y 
equals a  or ,3. To economize  on notation, we will formulate lemmas and proofs 
only for the former case. We first provide an outline  of the main steps of the 
proof. 
4.1.  Outline 
The  proof  consists  of  three  parts: (i)  an investigation of  the  beliefs  of  the 
players conditional on their observations, (ii) derivation of properties of the sets 
Al,  and (iii) the main part which involves an argument by contradiction. 
(i) We first show that the posterior beliefs are approximately symmetric in the 
sense  that, if E is small, the likelihood that player 1 assigns to player 2 making 
an observation x2 when his own observation is xl  is approximately equal to the 
likelihood  that  2  assigns to  1 observing  x1  when  his information is  x2.  This 
symmetry holds exactly if the prior is uniform and, for general priors, it holds 
approximately if the observation errors are small since in that case the prior is 
almost  constant  throughout the  region of  possible  realizations.  This  property 
implies that the  players have almost the  same beliefs  about the  difference  of 
their observations, which for the one-dimensional  case entails that 
(4.1)  FE  (X21X1)  +F2E(X1IX2) 1 
if E is small. (Fi (xj lxi) = P(XJ- < xj1  X[  = xi) is the probability that i assigns to j 
making  an  observation  below  xi  when  he  observes  xi.)  A  corresponding 
property obtains in the multi-dimensional case. 
(ii)  In  the  second  step  we  show  that  when  a  is  the  iterated  dominance 
solution of the unperturbed game  g  (i.e.  g E Da),  a  remains iteratively domi- 
nant when  the  players make noisy observations that are close  to  g.  It is also 
shown that an observation  xi  belongs to  A`  if and only if at  xi,  playing ai  is 
better  than  playing  3,i whenever  j  plays  ac  exactly on  A.  If we  denote  the 
latter strategy by a;, then, by continuity, J/7(a  lx<) = 0 for a boundary point  xl 
of  Al.  It  will  be  clear  that  at  suqh a  boundary point  xE, if  ?  is  small,  the 
probability aE(xff)2  that player i  assigns to  j  playing aj  must be  close  to  the 
probability 3j(x-)  that  makes  i  indifferent between  his  two  actions  in  g(x4). 
Finally we prove a Lemma which will help to show that the boundary points that 
are used in step (iii) must be close to each other. 
2 The  reader should note  the  distinction between  aj'(x),  the  probability which the  strategy aj 
assigns to action aj at the observation xj  on the one  hand, and, on the other,  a'(x,),  i =#j, which 
denotes  the probability which player i will assign to j's choosing  aj  when i observes  x,  and j  uses 
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(iii) In the heart of the proof we argue by contradiction: Assume  x'  lies on a 
curve C with g(C)  cR'a  and g(C)  nqt  D  , but nevertheless  x' 0AIj nqA' for 
?  small. The crucial step of the proof consists in the construction of boundary 
points  xE and xI  of  AE and AE, respectively, that are close to each other and 
for which 
(4.2)  lim 52(X1)  +1(X2)  < 1  and 
(4.3)  lim a( (xl)  + al (x2)  >1, 
conditions  that  cannot  be  satisfied  simultaneously  since,  by  step  (ii)  above, 
ay(xi)  = 3i(xE) if E is small. Now (4.2) will be satisfied since  x'  and x2  have a 
common limit x*  with  g(x*)  E R't. To fulfil (4.3), the boundary points have to 
be  carefully chosen  and, in the  general  case,  this requires a rather elaborate 
construction which is given in the Appendix. In the case where  e  is one-dimen- 
sional, however, the argument is straightforward:  Assume  C connects  x'  with a 
point  x  in  Da' with  x <x'  and  let  xff be  the  point  closest  to  x'  such  that 
(x, xi4)  cA  . Then  a (xif) > Fi(xW  Ix)  for E small enough so (4.3) follows from 
(4.1). 
4.2.  Posterior Beliefs 
We first introduce some notation  associated with  Fr. Denote  by FiE(x,  xi lxi) 
the distribution function of (X,  Xj)  conditional on  Xi- =xi  and let  fif(x,  xjlxi) 
be  the  corresponding  density.  Similarly, let  FiE(xjlxi)  and  fif(xjlxi)  be  the 
conditional distribution and density of Xjf. If we write 9p  for the joint density of 
(Ei,  eEE) (i.e. SD  (z)  =  8  p(E  - 1z)),  then, for i, j =  1, 2, i #j, 
Jh(x)fp(x1 -x,  x2 -x)  dx 
( 4.4)  fiE(  xjIxi  )  = 
ffh(x)>Et(x1  -X,  X2-  x)  dxj  dx 
Note that if X  is uniformly distributed on & and if B(xi,  E), the ball with radius 
8  centered at xi, is completely contained in 0,  then  h(x)  is a constant for all x 
that yield  a  contribution  to  any of  the  integrals  in  (4.4).  Thus  h(x)  can  be 
factored out from the fraction and, since the denominator of the new expression 
equals one, we get 
ff-(xjlxj)  =  fp  (x1  x,  X2 -x)  dx =  d  (x1  x2), 
where  IPE is the  density of  eE1 -  EE2,  the  difference between  the  observation 
errors. Consequently, with a uniform prior, if B(x_, 8)  c  & for i = 1, 2, then 
fl  (X2l1)  =f2(xl1  x2)  =  If E(X1  X2)- GLOBAL  GAMES  999 
Hence 
F1(X2Ix1) =  f  f(x1  -y)  dy 
=1  ?(Z-X2)  dz 
z>X1 
=  1 -F2(X1  X2), 
which shows that (4.1) holds exactly in this case. The corresponding property in 
the multi-dimensional case is that, for p E Rm, 
(4.5)  P(PX2-<-PX2IX=  X1)?+P(pXlPX1  IX2=X2)=1. 
(Geometrically, the terms on the left-hand side denote the probabilities that Xji 
lies in the negative halfspace py < pxj conditional upon observing Xf6  =xi.)  To 
see why (4.5) holds note that 
P(  X  Epx2IX1  =x1)  = f  /(x1  -y)  dy 
PY  PX 2 
=  P(prEE  -pEE2  >  PX1  PX2) 
and, similarly, 
(PX1 < PX1  IX2 = X2) = f  q?(  -X2)  dy 
py<pX1 
=  P(pE1  -pEE2  <  pX1  -PX2). 
Our first lemma shows that, for small E, (4.5) remains approximately valid even 
without  a  uniform prior. The  intuition  is  obvious: If  E is  small,  the  prior is 
almost  constant  for  all  realizations  that  the  players consider  possible  on  the 
basis of their observations. 
LEMMA  4.1:  Let x1, X2  E &.  Then there exists a constant k(x1, x2) such that for 
all p E Rm  and all sufficiently  small E 
(4.6)  | P(PX2  ?px2X  =X1)  +P(pXj  ?px1IX< =x2)  -  I  s  k(x1,x2)E. 
PROOF:  Fix  8 > 0 such that h(x) > 8  for all  x E B(x1, E) U B(x2, E). Since  h 
is  continuously  differentiable,  there  exists  a constant  l(xi)  such  that  Ih(x) - 
h(xi) I  < 1(xi)E for all x E B(xi,  E). Por any xi  we have 
h(xi)  -  1(xi)E ql(l-2  ,j-xlj  h(xi)  + 1(xi)E  (X  X2 
h(x  ) + l(xi)E  (  -X2)  fi(xjIxi)  h(x)  -  l(x)E  (x1-x2) 
(Cf. the argument below (4.4).) Hence,  if we choose  E so that l(xi)E < 8/2  and 
define  k(xi)  = 41(xi)/8,  then 
(4.7)  Ifi(XIxi) 
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Substituting these  bounds  for ff6(x, lxi)  into  the  expressions  for P(pXj  < pxj I 
Xf6  = xi)  and proceeding  as in the case where  X  is uniform, we obtain (4.6) by 
defining  k(x1, x2) =  k(x1) + k(x2).  Q.E.D. 
4.3.  Properties  of the Set Ai? 
The  first lemma  shows  the  suite  intuitive  result  that,  if  a  is  the  iterative 
dominance solution of  g,  then playing ai  is conditionally dominant at  g  when 
observations are only slightly noisy. 
LEMMA  4.2: If,  for a compact set S C &,  g(S)  cDa,  then S C  nA,  for all 
sufficiently  small e. 
PROOF: For any x E S, either (i) g(x)  E Da  so that ga(X)>  0,  ga(X)>  0 and 
gf(x)  < 0 or (ii) g(x)  E D2  so that  ga(X)>  0,  ga(X)>  0 and gj(x)  < 0.  Since g 
is continuously  differentiable, we  may choose  E small enough  so  that,  for  all 
x E S, these  inequalities  remain satisfied on  B(x,  3?).  It will suffice to consider 
case (i). Then, if player 1 makes an observation in B(x,  2?),  he knows that a1 is 
a dominant  strategy for each  possible  realization  of  the  game.  Consequently, 
B(x,  2?)  cA  If player 2 observes x, he knows that player l's observation is in 
B(x,  2?)  and, hence, that a1 is conditionally dominant for 1. He also knows that 
a2  is the unique best response to  a1. Thus, x eA?-'2  and the proof is complete 
since the  Ai?'n  are nondecreasing in n.  Q.E.D. 
The  next  lemma  derives  a  convenient  characterization  of  Ai  when  the 
associated game is well inside G+:  Then, the points in A-' are exactly those for 
which ai  is strictly better given that j chooses  aj  on  A'. 
LEMMA 4.3:  Define the strategy aE of player j in  Fr  by 
(1  if xj=  eA, 
(4.8)  a?(Xi) 
=  j  }EX  (4.8)  a(x1) 
0  oterwise. 
Let x  i E  Q  be such that g(x)  E G  I for all x E B(x , 8). Then x  E1  A'  if and only 
if Vi  (aj Ixi)  > 0. 
PROOF:  Slnce  Ajf  '  for all n, it is obvious  that ai  E Si- 
n.  If xi eAi,  then 
xieA,,nII  for  some  n.  Hence  ViJ(sjlxi)>0  for  all  sjESj,n  and,  therefore, 
Vi-- (a  xi)  >  O. 
Conversely,  assume  ViJ7(aIx1)>  0  and  define  a,, n  as  in  (4.8)  but  with  A' 
replaced by Aj, n. For Sj E Sj?n  we have 
i  (i  )  |[SijXi)  (  gia(X  )  +  gi  (  x))  -gi  (X  )]dFi  (X  S XjlXi  ) 
>  | f[a  n(X  )(ga(X)  +  gf(x))  -gi(x)]  dFi(x, xjlxi) 
=  Vi (aj  i x), GLOBAL GAMES  1001 
where the  inequality follows from the  assumption that  g(x) E Gj'  for all 
x eB(xj,E).  Hence,  xi eAi?' n+1  if  and only if  ViJ(a'  nlXi)  >0.  Now  a  n  con- 
verges pointwise  to a-' so, by Lesbegue's  bounded  convergence  theorem 
VE  n(aX)nlx  )-*  Vi(a-  Ixi)  as  n -oo. 
Therefore,  Vi'(an  Ixi)>  0  and,  hence,  xi E A 'n  for  n  large  enough  which 
implies xi E A'.  Q.E.D. 
For a strategy sJ of player j in F-,  let  sj-l(xi) denote the probability that player 
i assigns  to j  choosing  action aj if his observation  is xi: 
(4.9)  Si-'(xi)  = |sj(  xj) dFi'(  Xj  Ixi). 
The  next lemma shows that in the  case where  ViE(sjlxi) =  0, this probability is 
close to the probability  sj(xi) (as defined  in (2.2)) that makes  player  i indifferent 
between his two pure actions in  g(xi).  (Of course, if  ga'(xi)  or  gf(xi)  is 
negative, s-(xi) cannot be interpreted  as a probability,  but Lemma 4.2 shows 
that such an xi cannot be a zero of Vi' if E is small.) 
LEMMA  4.4:  Let g(xi)  E G+.  There exists a constant k(xi)  such that,  for  all 
s-,E S,  if ViE(sjlxi)  = 0, then Isjf(xi)  -  - 
(xi)l  < k(xi)E. 
PROOF:  Let  k  be  an upper bound on the  absolute values of  the partial 
derivatives  of g on e  and define k(xi) = mk/(ga(xi)  + gP(xi)). Then 
Vi( sIxi ) =  ff|[  sj(  xj)  (ga  ( x)  + gf(x))  -gi((x)]  dFiE(x,  xjlxi) 
s  f[Sj(Xj)(ga(Xi)  + gf(xi))  -  gf(xi)]dFiJ(xjtxi)  + mkE 
=  [[sj(xXj)  -Sj(xj)]dFIf(xjlxj)  +k(xi)E]  [ga(Xi)  +gi3(xi)] 
=  [sj(xi)  -Sj(xi)  + k(xi)e]  [gi(xi)  + gf(xi)]. 
Consequently,  if  ViE(sjlxi)  =  0,  then  sjE(xi)  >  -j(xi) -  k(xi)e.  The  reverse  in- 
equality  is proved  in the same  way.  Q.E.D. 
An important  consequence  of Lemmas  4.3 and 4.4 is that aE(xi)  must  be close 
to &j(xi)  if xi is a boundary  point of A'. Our final lemma  shows  that if we start 
looking  for boundary  points  within  a dominance  solvable  region  of R , then any 
boundary  point of AE must be close to a boundary  point of A-' and vice versa. 1002  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
LEMMA  4.5:  If xi is a boundary  point of Al  and g(x)  E Ra  for all x in B(xi,  ?), 
then B(xi, 2?)  A' 
PROOF:  If B(x1, 2E) CAJ,  then, by assumption (A4), 
i  (a. 
{xi)  =  ffga  (x)dFf6(x,  xjlxi) > 0 
since ga(x)  > 0 for all relevant x. Hence  xi eAI  by Lemma 4.3.  Q.E.D. 
4.4.  The Main Step of the Proof 
Since in the general, multi-dimensional case the main argument of the proof 
is obscured by a number of technical details, we  defer the concluding step for 
that case to the Appendix. Here we give the argument for the one-dimensional 
case where & c  [R. 
We argue by contradiction: Assume  x'  is contained in an interval C =  [x, x]- 
such that g(C)  n Da #  0  and g(C)  cRa,  but that nevertheless  x' CA-  nA-  for 
arbitrarily small  E. By  Lemma  4.2,  then,  g  (x')  > 0  for  i =  1,2,  and,  thus, 
g(x')  E G+ n G2 . Without loss of generality, we may assume the following: 
(i) g(C)  c  G  n Gj  (if this condition is not satisfied, restrict attention to the 
segment  of  C  around  x'  that  lies  inside  G1  n G  ;  since  mini  gat(x)  has  a 
positive  lower bound on  C, this segment  necessarily contains points in  D a  as 
well); 
(ii) g(x)  E D;  and 
(iii)  x < x' < x  (as  the  relevant  sets  are  open,  the  curve  can  be  slightly 
extended if desired). 
Noting that C is compact and reviewing the constructions of Lemmas 4.1 and 
4.4, we see  that there exists a constant  k such that 
k(x1>)<k  and  k(x,,x2)?<k  forall  xl,x2EC. 
If E is small enough  and such that  x' 0Aj  nArA,  then, by Lemma 4.5, both  Al 
and A-  must have boundary points on C. We let  x< denote  the first boundary 
points starting from x: 
xi = sup {x  E C: 
[,x, 
x)  cA-} . 
Lemma  4.3  and  the  continuity  of  Vi7 imply that  ViJ(alx<)  =  0  for  i =  1,2. 
Hence,  by Lemma 4.4, 
(4.10)  a--(x`)  <j(xi)+kE  for  i,j=1,2,  i$j. 
On the other hand, for sufficiently small E, X  -  x > 2E by Lemma 4.2. Hence 
aj ( xi)  >  P (iXj  <  Xj IXi  =  X) 
and therefore, by Lemma 4.1, 
(4.11)  a--(xl)  + a  (x2)  I-kE. GLOBAL  GAMES  1003 
Combining (4.10) and (4.11) yields 
g2(X--) + 9,(x-)  > 1-  3kE. 
Letting  E go to zero, we see  that for the common (Lemma 4.5) limit x*  of  x4E 
and x2 
g2(X*)  +S1(X*)  >  1, 
but this contradicts the  fact that  g(x*)  E Ra n G + n Gj  (cf.  (2.4))  and com- 
pletes the proof. 
5.  ROLE  OF ASSUMPTIONS 
The equilibrium selection  result presented above is driven by two fundamen- 
tal features: the existence-guaranteed  by the condition stated in the Theorem 
-of  dominance solvable regions  Da  and  DO within the class of games  g(O); 
and  the  continuity-ensured  by  assumptions  (Al),  (A2)  and  (A3)-of  the 
function  g  as well  as the densities  of the prior and the observation errors. In 
contrast,  the  assumption  (A4)  of  bounded  error  supports  is  made  only  to 
simplify our  argument but  is not  really essential.  As  long  as payoffs and the 
error density are bounded, (A4) can be dispensed with. The following discussion 
will  therefore  focus  on  the  condition  of  the  Theorem  and  the  continuity 
assumptions. 
It has already been  made  clear in the  introduction that our result depends 
crucially on the existence,  within the class of games, of regions where each of 
the  two  action  pairs  y,  y  e {ca,/3},  can  be  established  as  strict  dominance 
solutions.  These  regions are the  indispensable  starting points  for the  iterated 
dominance argument in the global game. The Theorem  adds to the nonempti- 
ness of these regions the requirement that from the game g(x)  in Ry there exist 
a  continuous  link to  another  game where  y  is the  strict dominance  solution 
through a region where the risk dominance relationship is never reversed. The 
study of simple examples, however, suggests that this second property is likely to 
be implied by the existence of strict dominance regions. This is indeed the case 
for the  example  in the  introduction provided  that the  parameter  x  is  drawn 
from an interval. The implication also holds for the "natural" parameterization 
g(x)  = x  when  each payoff entry gk  (k = 1,...  , 8) corresponds to  an indepen- 
dent random variable Xk  which is defined on a real interval. 
The  proof  of  the  last  assertion  may be  sketched  as follows:  Suppose  x' E 
&, g(x')  E Ra  and,  for  some  x" E &, g(x") E Da  so  that  the  nonemptiness 
condition is met. Without loss of generality we may assume that gf(x")  < 0. To 
simplify, also  assume  that  g  (x") <gg(x')  (other  cases  can  be  handled  in  a 
similar way). Let  x~  be  the point which agrees with  x'  for the  six payoffs that 
determine ga,  ga,  and g3  and agrees with x" for the two payoffs that determine 
g.  Moreover let  C  be the straight line between  x  and x'. Then, by construc- 
tion, x E 0, g(xT)  E Da, C c  &, and g(C)  c R'  so the condition of the Theorem 
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Another  essential  prerequisite for our result is that, given a strategy for the 
opponent,  a player's expected  payoff (and thus his expected  net gain Vi'(  l *  )) 
from using a certain action is continuous in his observation. This ensures that a 
strict indifference  condition  (Vi<(  lxi) = 0)  has  to  be  satisfied at  any point  xi 
where  the player optimally switches from one  action to the other, a condition 
which is exploited in the characterization of the boundary points of the iterated 
dominance  sets  A-.  The  continuity  of  the  expected  payoffs results  from  the 
continuity  of  the  prior  density  (A2)  and  the  joint  error density  (A3).  Note, 
however, that' the latter assumption can be weakened: A  careful inspection of 
the proofs reveals that the Theorem holds as long as the difference between the 
error  terms,  E1 -  E2,  allows  a  continuous  density.  A  potentially  interesting 
variant which meets this requirement is when one of the players observes exactly 
the true value while the other player's observation contains an error term. 
To  see  the  importance  of  continuity,  it  is  instructive to  consider  a variant 
where, in the global game F%,  each player i observes the true value of  X  with 
probability 1 -  8,  i.e.  Xi[ is given by 
Xi  =  X  +  Yi, 
where Yi' is a (bounded) random variable satisfying Prob {Y7 = 0} = 1 -  8.  Now 
consider x E e  such that  g(x)  has both  a  and ,B as strict equilibria. We claim 
that, for sufficiently small 8,  playing any equilibrium of  g(x)  is compatible with 
(Bayesian Nash) equilibrium in a global game F'  satisfying (Al)  and (A2). To 
see why, it suffices to note that 
lim Prob {X = x and Xj  = x lXi = x} = 1, 
i.e.  as  E  goes  to  zero,  each  player  becomes  certain  that  both  he  and  his 
opponent  have observed the true value. Another variant which yields the same 
result is when the prior on 0,  instead of having an everywhere positive density, 
has support on a finite number of points. In this set-up (keeping (A3) and (A4)), 
for  E smaller than half the  minimum distance between  any of  the points,  the 
true value of  X  becomes  common knowledge to the players. 
Somewhat more  surprisingly, similar results are obtained  even  if there  is a 
real link between different games as long as the class of games is discrete. These 
results are derived in Monderer and Samet (1989) who consider the following 
set-up: Let (Q, I,  ,u  ) be a probability space, for  o E Q, let  g(G) be a game with 
a finite  set  of  players and  assume, that  {g(G):  o eQ  1}  is finite.  A  game  F  of 
incomplete information is now defined in the natural way. Monderer and Samet 
address the  question  under what  conditions  F  has  an  8-equilibrium which is 
close  to an arbitrary selection  of equilibria from the underlying class of games. 
Formally, if for each  o E 1  s(G) is an equilibrium of  g(G),  does there exist an 
8-equilibrium of  F  that is close  to s? The answer is shown to be affirmative if, 
on  a large (close  to  measure  one)  subset  of  1,  each  player knows with  high 
probability  which  game  will  be  played.  This  result  thus  suggests  that  the 
nonfinite state space is essential for our result. GLOBAL  GAMES  1005 
6.  EQUILIBRIUM  SELECTION  AND  THE  NASH  PROGRAM 
In this section we discuss the role of risk dominance and payoff dominance in 
Harsanyi and Selten's equilibrium selection  theory for the case of 2 x 2 games 
and compare their argument with the justification for risk dominance which can 
be  derived  from  our  own  model.  We  also  summarize  the  important  links 
between  our  approach  and  Nash's  work  on  bargaining  and  noncooperative 
games. 
6.1.  Risk Dominance vs. Payoff Dominance 
Harsanyi and Selten offer two complementary justifications of the risk domi- 
nance  criterion  for  2 x 2  games  with  two  strict  equilibria.  The  one  is  an 
axiomatic  derivation while  the  other,  more  heuristic justification  relies  on  a 
simplified version of  the  tracing procedure which the  authors use  in order to 
define the risk dominance relation for general games. 
The axiomatic derivation is based on three axioms: 
(i) invariance with respect to isomorphisms, 
(ii) best-reply invariance, and 
(iii) payoff monotonicity. 
The  first axiom rules  out  any  dependence  on  the  labeling  of  players  and 
actions or on positive linear utility transformations. In particular it implies that, 
in a symmetric game in which both  a  and  f3 are strict equilibria, the solution 
has to be the mixed equilibrium. Axiom (ii) guarantees that the risk dominance 
relation in a game where a  and f3 are strict equilibria only depends on the four 
deviation  losses  g a,  ga,  go,  and  go.  In the  same  setting the  last axiom says 
essentially that if, starting from a game where f3 does not risk-dominate a,  one 
or both  payoffs associated  with  the  outcome  a  are increased  while  all other 
payoffs remain unchanged, then  a  risk-dominates f3 in the new game. Harsanyi 
and Selten  show that the only definition of risk dominance that satisfies these 
axioms is the one given above, i.e. the equilibrium with the largest Nash product 
is risk-dominant. 
In the heuristic justification, selection of the risk-dominant equilibrium results 
from postulating an initial state of uncertainty where the players have uniformly 
distributed second-order beliefs. To be more specific, let j's initial beliefs about 
i's  choice  of  action  be  represented  by  the  mixture  zai  +(1  - z)f3,, z  E  [0, 1]. 
Player  i  does  not  know j's  beliefs  so,  applying the  principle  of  insufficient 
reason, he considers all values of  z  to be  equally likely. Player i  then reasons 
that, whatever the value of  z, j will use a best response against his beliefs, i.e. j 
will play aj  or fj  according as  z > si or z < si, the critical probability si being 
defined  as in (2.2). Hence,  player i  expects  j  to play (1 -  S-i)aj  + s,fij  and will 
choose a best response against this mixed action, i.e. he will play ai  if 1 -  si >  s 
and  fi  if 1 -  si <  -j. Comparing with (2.3) one  sees  that, if both players follow 
this  line  of  reasoning,  they  will  end  up  coordinating  on  the  risk-dominant 
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It is certainly remarkable that two such different approaches lead to the same 
selection  criterion.  This  fact  suggests  that  the  risk  dominance  relation  is  a 
strategically highly significant property in 2 x 2 games. On the other hand, it has 
to be admitted that none of the justifications is built on an altogether solid basis. 
For instance, without going into details, it is not made clear why an equilibrium 
selection rule should satisfy the axiom of best-reply invariance. It is also difficult 
to find a compelling reason why the players' initial beliefs have to be uniformly 
distributed as in the heuristic approach. In this connection,  it should be noted 
that-in  contrast to our model where the exact shape of the prior is unimpor- 
tant-the  outcome of the heuristic approach depends crucially on the prior. For 
instance,  in the  game shown in Figure 2 (which is the  game  g(x)  in Figure  1 
with x = 3), the heuristic argument selects the Pareto-dominant equilibrium f3 if 
the  prior has a sufficient bias in favor of  this equilibrium. (Assume,  e.g.,  that 
player i's beliefs about j's beliefs have distribution function F(z)  =-z1.) 
The shakiness of the justifications appears perhaps most clearly from the fact 
that Harsanyi and Selten  themselves  in the  end  choose  not  to use  risk domi- 
nance as a general criterion. Instead they decide that payoff dominance should 
have precedence in case of conflict between the two criteria. Hence, in the game 
g(3),  the  Harsanyi/Selten  theory  selects  the  payoff-dominant equilibrium  fi 
although  a  is risk-dominant. Their motivation for giving precedence  to payoff 
dominance  is that "( ...)  risk dominance  is important only in those  situations 
where the players would be initially uncertain whether the other players would 
choose  one  equilibrium or the other. Yet,  if one  equilibrium would give every 
player  higher  payoffs than  the  other  would  (...)  every player can  be  quite 
certain that the other players will opt for this equilibrium which will make risk 
dominance  considerations irrelevant" (Harsanyi and Selten  (1988, p. 358)). In 
another  passage  of  the  book  they  admit that  the  players may be  justified  in 
relying only on  risk dominance  in some  situations, for instance  after a break- 
down  of  preplay communication.  Nevertheless,  they  conclude  that  "a  theory 
that considers both payoff and risk,dominance  is more in agreement with the 
usual image of what constitutes rational behavior" (pp. 89-90). 
These  arguments for giving precedence  to payoff dominance are hardly more 
compelling than the previous justifications of risk dominance. Rather, Harsanyi 
and  Selten's  hesitation  on  this  point  seems  to  be  a  sign that  their  theory  is 
located  on  a  level- of  abstraction where  the  problem of  equilibrium selection 
does  not  always have  a  determinate  solution.  Without  knowing more  details 
about the context of the game, including the possibilities of preplay communica- 
tion, it is difficult to predict whether the players will conform to risk dominance, GLOBAL  GAMES  1007 
payoff dominance,  or some  other  criterion.  In this  respect  we  think that the 
global game approach presented  in this paper constitutes a certain advance. By 
perturbing the players' payoff information, we obtain an incomplete information 
game where  play in  accordance with  risk dominance  results from a standard 
noncooperative equilibrium concept. Thus, we embed any given 2 x 2 game in a 
context  which  is  sufficiently  rich  to  generate  a  determinate  solution  to  the 
equilibrium selection  problem. 
One advantage of our approach is that it supplies a more precise intuition for 
risk  dominance.  The  Harsanyi/Selten  theory  presents  risk  dominance  as  a 
measure  of  the  relative  stability  of  equilibria  in  the  presence  of  strategic 
uncertainty, but-granted  the  ad hoc character of  the  heuristic derivation-it 
fails  to  provide  a convincing argument for the  relevance  of  such uncertainty. 
(Indeed,  in the above quotation, the precedence  given to the payoff dominance 
criterion is justified by the  absence of uncertainty in games where this criterion 
is applicable.) In our model uncertainty about your opponent's choice of action 
appears when your observation is close to the point where he switches from one 
action to the other. Hence,  the optimal choice of a switching point requires the 
players to  consider  the  relative  riskiness of  the  two  alternative equilibria. In 
view  of  this,  it  is  quite  intuitive  that  the  equilibria  must  be  approximately 
equivalent in terms of risk dominance at the switching points. 
6.2.  Nash's Bargaining Theory  and the Nash Program 
The  preceding  analysis of  equilibrium selection  in 2 x 2 games  has  several 
notable connections with Nash's (1950, 1951, 1953) seminal work on bargaining 
and noncooperative  games.  First, there  is an obvious link between  risk domi- 
nance and Nash's bargaining solution since both choose the point corresponding 
to the largest Nash product (in the bargaining set-up this means the product of 
utility differences between  the  agreement  and the  disagreement  point). Actu- 
ally, in their search for a satisfactory definition of risk dominance, Harsanyi and 
Selten were guided by the desire "to reproduce the results of Nash's bargaining 
theory with fixed threats" (Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p. 215)). 
Secondly,  Nash  justifies  his  bargaining solution  by  means  of  an  axiomatic 
derivation where  a  leading  idea  consists  of  imposing  conditions  on  how  the 
solution  should  be  allowed  to vary on  a whole  class of  games.  Harsanyi and 
Selten's axiomatic derivation relies on the same type of conditions. Actually all 
their axioms explicitly force  solutiohs  of  different games to be  linked to  each 
other.  Our  approach  also  exploits  conditions  of  this  kind,  but,  rather  than 
simply postulating them, we derive them from more basic conditions of imper- 
fect information. 
Moreover, Nash complements his axiomatic derivation with an explicit nonco- 
operative  approach where  he  tries to  select  the  axiomatic solution  by adding 
noise to the bargaining game. This approach was not completely satisfactory for 
Nash did not succeed  in excluding the possibility of multiple solutions, but his 
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more  detailed  model,  by  Carlsson  (1991).  These  authors  add  noise  to  the 
parties' bids in Nash's noncooperative game and show the existence of a unique 
solution as the noise vanishes. The formal structure of these bargaining games is 
very similar to  that  of  global  games.  In  particular, the  problem  of  choosing 
optimal bids in a noisy bargaining game involves the same kind of risk consider- 
ations as the problem of choosing a point where to switch from one  action to 
the other in a global game. 
Nash's  strategic  analysis  of  bargaining  inaugurates  a  tradition  which  has 
become  known as the  Nash program. The  common denominator of this tradi- 
tion  is  a  dissatisfaction  with  the  ad  hoc  character  of  many  cooperative  or 
axiomatic solution  concepts  and the  wish to  derive predictions within  strictly 
noncooperative models. In our view, the approach of this paper could be viewed 
as an attempt to extend the Nash program to a more general field of  equilib- 
rium selection. 
7.  COMMON  KNOWLEDGE  AND  PAYOFF  UNCERTAINTY 
In this section  we  compare  our  approach with  two other  models  of  payoff 
uncertainty, namely  Rubinstein's  electronic  mail  game  and  Harsanyi's games 
with randomly disturbed payoffs. In the final subsection we shortly discuss the 
role  of  common  knowledge  for  the  justification  of  the  iterated  dominance 
solution concept that we have been using. 
7.1.  Common Knowledge  and Rubinstein's  Electronic Mail Game 
As we have already pointed out, our result is driven by the remote influence 
that the dominance solvable regions  Da  and DI  exert on the region of games, 
Gqan G),  having both  a  and  f3 as strict equilibria. This influence  is due to  a 
certain  "lack of  common  knowledge"  in  the  global  game.  Once  this  lack of 
common knowledge is taken into account, it is no longer paradoxical that, in the 
game  g(3)  of Figure 2, the players are forced to select  a  although, when  8  is 
small,  they  know  that  a  uniformly better  equilibrium  f3 is  available: If  x  is 
drawn from an interval [x, x] with x > 4, the fact that f3 is an equilibrium is not 
common knowledge. 
To formalize this assertion, let  Q = {o: o.,  = (x, x1, x2)} be the state space and 
let  E  be an event. Denote  by KE the event that both players know E and write 
K+l  = K(KnE).  Then,  the  event  E  is  common  knowledge  at  all  states  o 
belonging to  n  nKnE.  Now, let  E denote the event that f3 is an equilibrium, i.e. 
E =  {  e  Q: x < 4}. Player i  knows that E  obtains if and only if xf  < 4 -  ,  i.e. 
KE =  {  e  1:  x  < 4 -  8,  i = 1, 2}; player  i  knows that player j  knows that  E 
obtains  if and only if x? < 4 -  3e (K2E  = {o e 1:  xf  < 4 -  3e, i = 1, 2}). Contin- 
uing inductively one  sees  that the  event  E  cannot be  common knowledge  for 
any 8>  0. 
A similar lack of common knowledge occurs in Rubinstein's (1989) electronic 
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describe  Rubinstein's  model,  refer  to  Figure  3  where  we  let  g = g(3)  and 
g'=  g(5), g(x)  being defined as in Figure 1. Then  g'  is dominance solvable with 
solution  a  while  g  has  both  a  and  f3 as  strict  equilibria.  Note  that  a  is 
risk-dominant but f3 is Pareto-dominant in  g.  Rubinstein considers the follow- 
ing situation: First, one of the games, g  or g', is selected,  each with probability 
1/2.  Player  1  is  always informed  about  the  game  selected.  Player  2  is  not 
informed if the game is g'. If the game is g, player 1 automatically sends player 
2  a  message  (saying that  the  game  is  g)  which  player  2,  upon  receiving  it, 
automatically acknowledges, an acknowledgement which, when received by 1 is 
again  automatically acknowledged,  etc.  The  communication  technology,  how- 
ever, is imperfect: Each message gets lost with a small probability 8 and, as soon 
as  a  message  is  lost,  the  communication  process  stops.  As  a  result  it  never 
becomes  common knowledge which game has been  selected. 
Rubinstein  shows  that  even  if  many  messages  have  been  exchanged  and, 
hence, the players are sure that the game is g, each knows that the other knows 
this, etc.,  rational players will not  choose  the  payoff-dominant equilibrium f3. 
The argument is simple and uses induction on the number of messages received. 
Obviously, conditional on the fact that he has not received any message, player 
2  will  choose  a  since  he  will  consider  it  very  likely  that  the  game  is  g'. 
Conditional on the fact that he has received  k but not  k + 1 messages, player i 
considers it about equally likely that it was his acknowledgement that got lost as 
that  j's  acknowledgement  of  the  k th  message  got  lost.  By  the  induction 
hypothesis, i  knows that j  will play aC in the first case and thus concludes that 
the probability of j choosing  fj  is at most around 1/2.  Therefore, the expected 
payoff associated with Pi is at most around 2 so it is conditionally dominant for 
i to choose  ai. 
The  reader  notices  that  the  forces  at  work  in  Rubinstein's  model  closely 
parallel those in our global game model: The result is driven by the fact that a 
is dominant in  g'  and risk-dominant in  g.  Rubinstein  considers it paradoxical 
that  the  Pareto-dominant  equilibrium  is  excluded  since  it  implies  "that  the 
game-theoretic 'prediction' for the 'almost common knowledge' situation is very 
different  from  the  situation  with  common  knowledge"  (Rubinstein  (1989, 
p.  385)).  We  are  not  convinced.  We  do  not  know  what  the game-theoretic 
"prediction"  is  for  the  common  knowledge  situation.  In  our  view,  it  is  not 
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equilibrium. The prediction for a game with multiple equilibria-in  particular if 
there  is  a  conflict  between  Pareto  dominance  and  risk  dominance-cannot 
be  determined  independently  of  the  context  in  which  the  game  is  played. 
Rubinstein's  electronic  mail  game  as  well  as  global  games  are  examples  of 
contexts  where  the  informational  conditions  force  the  players  to  choose  the 
risk-dominant equilibrium. 
7.2.  Harsanyi's Randomly Disturbed Games 
Harsanyi (1973) analyzes games where each player is slightly uncertain about 
the  payoffs of  his  opponents.  His  major finding is  that,  in  this  perturbation, 
there  is  no  need  for  the  players  to  actively  randomize:  A  mixed  strategy 
equilibrium  of  a  normal  form  game  can  be  approximated  by  pure  strategy 
equilibria of  slightly perturbed  games.  For  the  present  context,  however, the 
most significant result is that, in generic normal form games, all Nash equilibria 
are robust against Harsanyi's perturbation. Hence,  it is interesting to compare 
Harsanyi's model  and our own approach for 2 x 2 games in order to  see  why 
their results are so different. 
Let  G  be  the  set  of  2 x 2 games in which each  player i  has the  action set 
Si =  {a3i,,f3}  and let S =  Sl  x S2. Any g E G can be written as g = (g1, g2) where 
gi  R  4describes  i's payoffs in g. For s E S and i = 1, 2, let  Ei(s)  be a random 
variable which takes values in R  and has a continuous density; assume E1 and 
E2  are independent.  For g E G  and  E >  0, Harsanyi considers the  incomplete 
information game Fe(g)  described by the following rules: 
1. A realization (e1, e2) of (E1, E2)  is drawn. 
2. Player i is informed about ei (and about nothing else). 
3. The players choose  actions s = (s,  S2)  simultaneously. 
4. Each player i receives payoff gi(s)  + eei(s). 
Comparing Harsanyi's approximating sequence  {FE(g)}8  Io with the sequence 
of  global  games  {Fe}e 0  as  defined  in  Section  3,  one  notes  three  important 
differences: 
(i) Harsanyi lets the prior uncertainty vanish while we keep the prior constant 
and  let  the  residual  uncertainty, which  remains  after  the  players have made 
their observations, vanish for each observation. 
(ii)  In  Harsanyi's  set-up  different  players'  payoffs  are  independently  dis- 
tributed.  Our  model  allows  both  for  independence  and  correlation  in  this 
respect. 
(iii) In Harsanyi's model a player learns his own payoffs exactly but does not 
receive  any information about the  opponent's  payoffs. Since payoffs are inde- 
pendent,  the  player's observation does  not  tell  him anything about the  oppo- 
nent's payoffs. In our model, players make (imperfect) observations of the entire 
game, i.e.  they learn something about both players' payoffs. Since observations 
are  correlated  with  the  actual  game,  observations  of  different  players  are 
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The third point in particular is of major importance. A necessary prerequisite 
for  the  action  from  a  distance  which  occurs  in  our  model  is  that  a  player's 
beliefs  about what the opponent  is going to do are correlated with the player's 
observation: If player i observes a game close to Da, then he will think that his 
opponent is likely to play aj (if only because it is likely that j will have observed 
a game actually belonging to Da)  and, hence, i will play ai. Such a phenomenon 
cannot occur in Harsanyi's model where player i's beliefs about j's behavior are 
independent  of  his  observation.  Actually,  in  Harsanyi's model,  the  players' 
first-order beliefs  are common knowledge.  Hence,  in contrast with what  hap- 
pens in our model, there is no increase in the range of uncertainty as you ascend 
to  higher levels  in the  hierarchy of beliefs  and, as  E goes  to zero,  it becomes 
common knowledge that the actual game is very close  to  g  (provided that the 
error terms El  and  E2  are bounded.) 
Hence,  there  are  considerable  differences  between  the  two  models  and  it 
should not be surprising that the results are completely different as well. For a 
2 x 2 game g  with three equilibria Harsanyi shows that all three equilibria can 
be approximated by the beliefs associated with equilibria of the game FE(g); i.e. 
for every equilibrium s of  g, there exists an equilibrium s'  of  Fp(g)  for which 
the associated beliefs  (defined as in (4.9) but independent  of  xi)  converge to  s 
as  e  tends  to  zero.  On the  other  hand, in our model,  only the  risk-dominant 
equilibrium can be approximated; i.e. if s is the risk-dominant equilibrium of  g 
and s-  is an equilibrium of  F',  then  s5(g)  converges to  s. Note  the difference 
between the two notions of convergence: We investigate pointwise convergence 
of  equilibrium  strategies  while  Harsanyi  studies  convergence  of  equilibrium 
beliefs.  In Appendix  B, we  construct a hybrid model which contains our own 
model  and  Harsanyi's  as  extreme  special  cases.  The  mathematical  analysis 
clearly brings out the differences between  the various models. 
In view of  the  important differences between  the  results of the  two models 
one  would,  of  course,  like  to  know  which  one  provides  the  most  relevant 
description  of  payoff  uncertainty  for  economic  and  other  applications.  The 
answer to  this  question  requires  more  knowledge  about  how  agents  acquire 
information than we possess today, but the following remarks may nevertheless 
be  of  some  interest.  In  Harsanyi's  model,  the  players'  first-order posterior 
beliefs  are  assumed  to  be  common  knowledge,  i.e.  although  each  player  is 
uncertain about his opponent's exact payoffs, the exact distribution from which 
they  are  drawn are  common  knowledge.  This  kind  of  assumption  has  now 
become  standard  in  game-theoretic  applications,  but  it  is  open  to  a  rather 
obvious objection: Granted that it is'  unrealistic to assume that the exact payoffs 
are common  knowledge,  why would  this  assumption be  more  plausible when 
applied  to  first-order beliefs?  Our model  escapes  this  difficulty since  there  is 
residual uncertainty at any level of posterior beliefs; in other words there is no 
n such that the players' nth-order beliefs are common knowledge. On the other 
hand, as long  as we want to  interpret our result within the  traditional game- 
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level  of  the  rules  of  the  global  game.  In  the  following  subsection  we  briefly 
discuss alternative interpretations. 
7.3.  Iterated Dominance and Common Knowledge 
Our Theorem is based on a relatively weak equilibrium concept, viz. iterated 
elimination of dominated strategies. An attractive feature of iterated dominance 
-in  contrast with stronger concepts such as Nash equilibrium or Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium-is  that we know a general condition which ensures its implemen- 
tation: In the context of our model, if the rules of the global game-as  given by 
E  and  the  functions  g,  h,  and  p-and  the  players' rationality are  common 
knowledge,  then  the  players  will choose  serially undominated  strategies  and, 
thus, act in conformity with our Theorem. 
This justification of our solution concept, however, may not be totally convinc- 
ing since  a major motivation for our approach has been  the wish to relax the 
common knowledge assumption. Hence,  it would be desirable to find alternative 
justifications which-instead  of simply moving this assumption from one level of 
analysis  to  another-dispense  with  it  altogether.  The  kind  of  stories  that 
naturally come  to one's  mind are those where  the strategy choices,  instead of 
being determined by strictly rational considerations, result from some  learning 
or evolutionary process. Intuitively, granted that such a process would favor the 
use  of  strategies  that  are  relatively successful  in  terms of  average payoffs, a 
stable state seems to require that only serially undominated strategies are used. 
Of course, this intuition remains to be formalized and proved, but we feel  that 
recent  progress with  learning  models  are  very  promising  in  this  respect.  In 
particular, Milgrom and  Roberts  (1989)  show that,  for  an  important class of 
games and a great variety of learning processes, the sequence of strategy choices 
will  eventually  be  confined  to  the  set  of  strategies  which  survive  iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
Two  central aims in recent  game-theoretic  research have been  to  arrive at 
unique solutions3 on the one  hand, and to incorporate more realistic informa- 
tional assumptions on the other. There is often  thought to exist a conflict and, 
thus,  a  necessary  trade-off  betw'een these  two  goals.  The  concept  of  global 
games that has been presented here indicates that this need not be the case. On 
3The  importance of  uniqueness  is stressed  by Robert Aumann  who writes in the  foreword to 
Harsanyi  and  Selten  (1988):  "Nash  equilibrium  makes  sense  only  if  each  player  knows  which 
strategies the others are playing; if the equilibrium recommended  by the theory is not unique, the 
players will not have this knowledge. Thus it is essential that for each game, the theory selects one 
unique equilibrium from the set of all Nash equilibria." GLOBAL  GAMES  1013 
the contrary,  the use of an informational  set-up  implying  a considerable  weaken- 
ing of the common  knowledge  assumption  has been shown  to generate  a model 
with interesting  equilibrium  selection properties. 
The paper's main message is that something  can be gained by moving  from 
the conventional  local analysis  of individual  games  to a global  analysis  of classes 
of  games: an equilibrium  of  a given game need not be  consistent with an 
equilibrium  rule for the  entire class of  games. The  global game approach 
provides  a natural  way to force players  to link games together  and analyze  them 
simultaneously;  Unfortunately,  the approach  turned  out not to be easily  tractable 
mathematically  and we have been unable  to pursue  its implications,  in a general 
set-up, beyond the restricted  class 2 x 2 games. Extensions  to other classes of 
games are therefore urgently  called for. In this connection two distinct ques- 
tions become relevant. The first concerns the classes of games for which the 
global game is dominance  solvable  in the limit, while the second concerns  the 
nature  of the solution.  To conclude,  we discuss  some results  in Carlsson  (1989) 
and Carlsson  and van Damme (1991)  which concern  other classes of games but 
are based on somewhat  more restrictive  assumptions  than the ones used above. 
Carlsson  (1989) analyzes m x m unanimity  games defined on a one-dimen- 
sional parameter space and shows, roughly,  that an equilibrium  which risk- 
dominates all other equilibria  will be selected by the global game approach. 
Unfortunately,  equilibrium  selection rules based on Nash products  of deviation 
losses become intransitive-and,  thus, incapable of  selecting a solution-in 
general two-person games (see  Harsanyi and Selten (1988, p.  112 and pp. 
216-217)). Hence, even for this restricted  class of games, there is some reason 
to be pessimistic about the chances of always generating uniqueness by the 
present approach. 
In Carlsson  and van Damme (1993) we consider a class of n-person binary 
choice games. Each player  has the choice between a safe strategy  that yields a 
fixed payoff x  and a risky strategy  the payoff of which depends on the total 
number of players that choose the same strategy. If the number of players 
choosing  the risky  strategy  is small, it yields a low payoff,  but if many  choose it, 
it yields a payoff  that is higher  than x. Hence, there is again a conflict  between 
risk  dominance  and payoff  dominance.  We analyze  the global  game in which  the 
value of  x  is observed with some noise and show that this game is approxi- 
mately  dominance  solvable.  It turns  out that the derived  selection rule does not 
coincide  with selection based on a naive comparison  of Nash products  and also 
differs from the selection rule proposed by Harsanyi  and Selten, which shows 
that global  games  need not justify  the risk  dominance  principle  outside the class 
of 2 x 2 games. Quite interestingly,  Kim (1992) has shown that the outcome 
selected by the global game approach  is also obtained in an entirely different 
dynamic  context:  In his model the game is played  by randomly  and anonymously 
matched players  who are drawn  from large populations,  have perfect foresight 
about the evolution  of play, but face costs in adjusting  their actions.  Kim shows 
that, when the friction vanishes (i.e. the players become very patient or the 1014  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
adjustment cost becomes  negligible),  the  play settles  down at the  equilibrium 
selected  by the global game perturbation. 
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APPENDIX  A 
THE  FINAL  STEP OF THE  PROOF  IN THE  MULTI-DIMENSIONAL  CASE 
We  argue  by  contradiction:  Assume  x'  lies  on  a  curve  C  in  e  with  g(C)  n Da  '  +  and 
g(C)  sR',  but that arbitrarily  small E can be found such that x'  -A,  n A'.  By the same arguments 
as in Section  4.4, we  may assume that  C  is compact,  g(C)  c  GI  n G I  and  g(x)  E Da  where  x 
denotes one of the end points of the curve C. Since &,  Da,  R',  Gj  and G2j are open, we can find 
77  > 0 such that 
xE&  and  g(x)ERaqnGjnG'  forallxwithd(x,C)<4-r, 
g(x)E  Da  forall  xE  B(x,?J). 
Let  K  be  the  compact  set  of  all  points  in  &  that  are  at  a  distance  of  at  most  4?) of  C,  i.e., 
K = {x E 0:  d(x, C) 6 4'q}. In the remainder of the proof only points in K will play a role. Choose k 
so that, for the constants of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.4, k(x1) 6 k and k(x1, x2) 6 k for all xI,  X2  E K. 
Now  assume  E < ?/2  is  such  that  x'-Al  nA'  .  Also  assume  E  is  small  enough  so  that 
B(x,Q)  cAl  n A'  by Lemma 4.2. To  construct a point on  the boundary of  Al  n  A',  let  us move 
along the curve C from  x  in the  direction of  x'  until we first reach a point, say y,  for which the 
closed ball B(y,  ?J) is no longer contained in  Al  n A'.  Then  y  is strictly in between  x  and x'  and 
there  exists a point, say x1, on  the  boundary of  B(y, 'q) such that  x1  -Al  n  A'.  Without loss of 
generality, we may assume x1 OA'  so that  x1  is a boundary point of  A'.  Thus, VJ/(aIlx')  = 0 by 
Lemma 4.3 and the continuity of  VJ/(aI  )I  By Lemma 4.5 and since e <  71,  B(x,  2e)  must contain 
boundary points of  A'2. 
To construct a particular boundary point of  A'  in B(x',2e),  let  p =x'  -y  and walk along the 
ray from  y  passing  through  x1  until  you  reach  the  first point,  say  z,  such  that  the  halfspace 
{x: px 6pz}  intersected  with  B(x',  2e)  is  not  completely  contained  in  A'.  (See  Figure 4  for an 
illustration.) Let  x2  be a point on the hyperplane {x: px =pz}  within B(x',  2E) such that x2  A' 
Then, obviously, x2  is a boundary point of  A'  and, thus, V2(ale  Ix)  = 0. Now note that 
a2(xI)  >P(PX2E 6pX2j1X  =XI 
and 
alE(xE)  > P(X-'  E-  B(y, -71)jX2  .XE). 
In order to apply Lemma 4.1 and to derive a contradiction, we will show that the probability in the 
right-hand side of the latter inequality is approximately equal to  P(pXE <pxf  jX2E  =  x2).  Note  that 
by construction 
B(y,  )  C {x: px 6 px E} 
and let  D  be the set difference of these  sets. We will show that 
P(XfeE  DIX2E=x2)-  O  as  E-  O. 
Let D' be the set of all points x in D with d(x,  xf)  < 4e (see Figure 5). Since d(x1, x2) < 2e  for all GLOBAL  GAMES  1015 
FIGURE  4 
FIGURE 5d 
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x1 with f26(xl  x')  > 0 and since  d(x',  x2) < 2?,  it suffices to show that 
(A.1)  P(Xf  E D'IX2'  =x)  -0  as  ?  0. 
Recalling Lemma 4.1 we have 
P(X'  E D'IX2  =X2)  (1 + kv)f  e(xl-x)  dxl. 
By assumption (A3) the density  i/  is bounded, say by 1, so  f  is bounded by ?-ml.  Thus 
JDE(Xl  X2)  dxI<S  ?1IA(D ) 
where  A denotes  Lesbegue  measure. To prove (A.1),  therefore,  it suffices to show that A(D') is of 
order Em  +  Making a change of variables so that  y = (0, . . ., 0) and x  =  (0, . . .0,  ?7)  we can write 
D' as 
D' /t  E Hm f  S  1  L#2  >  2,  E  (i2  +  ((m-.  6  6?) 
E=  t7)2  22<  16  \ 
Obviously, I  |  < 4?  for  =  1.  m -  1 so by combining the last two inequalities in the definition of 
D'  we obtain that (m > ?j -  8E2/1.  Consequently 
D' c  ERm  j  < 64?  fori=1  .  -1  and  --8E2/sq  <  }) 
so that 
A(D ) 6  (4?)m  8? ,21 
and, indeed,  A(D') is of the order Em?1 
The steps of the proof performed so far allow us to conclude that 
(A.2)  lim inf I a  -( x -)  + al (x2E  ) ] >  lim inf [ P ( pX2'  < px'  XlX  = x1  ) 
?-0  ?-0 
+P(pXf  6Px1  IX2  =X2)]  =  1, 




O3  as  ?  0 
so that, by (A.2), for the common limit x*  of  x1 and x2  we must have 
g2(x*)  +s1(x*  )  >  1 
since  i/  is continuous  on  Gj+ n G2 . This  conclusion,  however,  is inconsistent  with  the  fact that 
K c R'.  Thus, we have derived a contradiction and the proof is complete. 
APPENDIX  B 
COMPARISON  WITH  HARSANYI  S  MODEL 
Here,  we will analyze a hybrid model of payoff uncertainty which contains both Harsanyi's and 
our  own  model  as  special  cases.  To  keep  the  computations  simple,  we  restrict  ourselves  to  a 
one-dimensional  and symmetric set-up. 
For x E  R,  let g(x)  be as in Figure 1. Let Eo, E1, and E2  be independent random variables, each 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. Let x* E (0, 4) and for 8, a >  0, define the random 
variable  Xl = Xi(x*, 8, E)  by means  of 
(B.1)  Xi = x* + 8Eo  + EEi,  i = 1, 2. 
Moreover, define the incomplete  information game G(x*,  8, a) by the following rules: 
1. A realization (x1, x2) of (X1, X2) is drawn. 
2. Player i is informed about xi (and about nothing else). 
3. The players choose  actions  s =  (s1, s2) simultaneously. 
4. Player i receives payoff g,(xi,  s) = sixi + 4(1 -  sXl  -  sj). GLOBAL  GAMES  1017 
This model is a hybrid of ours and Harsanyi's: each player knows his own payoffs, but knowing 
the  own  payoffs  gives  information  about  the  payoffs  of  the  opponent.  The  case  where  8 = 0 
corresponds to  Harsanyi's model,  as players' payoffs are independent  in this case. The  case with 
fixed 8 > 0 and  8  tending to zero corresponds more or less to our model. A difference is that now a 
player always knows his own payoffs exactly, which is not true in the model described in Section 3. 
However, it is easily checked that substituting the above condition 4 for the corresponding condition 
in the definition of a global game in Section 3 does not alter our main result. We will investigate the 
Bayesian equilibria of  G(x*,  8, ?)  and show that, in the first case, one  indeed  obtains results as in 
Harsanyi (1973), whereas, in the second case, one replicates the equilibrium selection  result of this 
paper. 
The game G(x*,  8,8)  is symmetric (if player i receives the information "Xi = x" he is in exactly 
the  same  situation  as  player j  receiving  the  information  "Xi =  x")  so  it  is  natural  to  look  for 
symmetric equilibria. Actually, one can show that restricting attention to such equilibria, as we will 
do here, implies no loss of generality. Noting that player i will play a1 if xi > 4 and 8i  if xi < 0, we 
will look for simple equilibria of the form 
/0  if xi<x, 
s'(x1)  \,  1  if xi> x, 
where si(xi)  is the probability that i chooses  a,  if his observation is x.  The condition that player i 
is indifferent if xi = x  may be written as 
(B.2)  4P(Xj <xlXi =x)  =x. 
Now, conditional on  Xi  taking the value  x, Xj  is normally distributed with mean  ,u and standard 
deviation  o,  where 
82X  +  ?2X* 
(B.3)  y  82+82  and 
r  28282+8411/2  (B.4)  [  =  2 +  ?2 
Hence,  (B.2) is equivalent to 
x  -  /t  x 
O'  4 
with  P being the standard normal distribution function. The last equation may be written 
(B.5)  ?(77(x  -x*))  =x/4 
where 
(B.6)  n  =  [82/(262  +  82)(852  +  82)]./2 
Note  that the extreme case corresponding to Harsanyi's model (8 = 0, 8  -> 0) can be approximated 
by choosing a sequence (8, 8)  --  0 where 8 <?  and, thus, 82/(82  +  82)  -O 0 and 7  mc.  The global 
game model corresponds to the case where  8  -?  0 and E <<  a so that  82/(82  +  82)  1  and  ij  --  0. 
Obviously, equation (B.5) has at least one solution. Furthermore, by drawing a couple of graphs the 
reader may easily convince himself that there  exists  71(x*)  > 0 such that equation (B.5)  has three 
solutions if -j  > -q(x*) and a unique solution if  qj <71(x*).  For iq > 71(x*), let x1(77) <X2(71) <X3(71) 
be the solutions. Then 
(B.7)  xl(71)  0  as  77  oo, 
(B.8)  x3(71)  4  as  77  -oo  and 
(B.9)  x2(n7)q  x*  with  ?P(71(X2(71)  -x*))  -x*/4  as  77- m0. 
If the  equilibrium of  G(x*,  8,?)  corresponding to the switching point  x'(n7) is played, then, in 
the limit as r7 
-  oo, players will coordinate on the equilibrium a: Since Xi  N(x*,(82  +  8 2)1/2)  and 
x'(77) <<x,  each  player i  chooses  ai  with a probability that tends  to  1 as  t7  m.  Similarly, the 1018  H.  CARLSSON  AND  E.  VAN  DAMME 
switching point x3(n)  induces beliefs corresponding to the equilibrium f  as n  -m oc. If players adopt 
the switching point  x2(71),  then each player i will choose  f,l  with a probability 
0((X2(t)  _X*)(52  +  2)1/2)  =  [7(X2(r)  -x*)((252  +  E2)/72)1/2] 
which tends to x*/4  as 77  -X  o in view of (B.9) and since ((282  +  E2)/E2)1/2  -  1. Hence,  the beliefs 
associated  with this equilibrium correspond to  the  mixed equilibrium of  the  game  g(x*).  Conse- 
quently, for  t7  --  oo, we replicate Harsanyi's results. 
In the other extreme case where  r7  -  0 it is easily seen that x(71) -+ 2 for the unique solution of 
(B.5). Hence,  in the limit player i chooses  a,  if xi > 2 and pj if x, < 2. This choice is in agreement 
with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance and, thus, with the main result of the present 
paper. Note that in the special case where x* = 2, the unique solution of (B.5) is given by x(q)  = x*. 
Hence,  in this case,  the beliefs  generated  by the  Bayesian equilibrium do not converge to a Nash 
equilibrium of the limit game g(x*),  but rather to the correlated equilibrium in which both a and p 
are played with probability 1/2. 
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